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Prepared for
Rujira

Prepared by
ret2basic.eth
y4y
FailSafe

Rujira Fin

Smart Contract Audit Report




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Executive Summary

FailSafe was engaged by Rujira Fin to conduct a smart contract audit on its THORChain blockchain implementation. Our elite team of security experts delved deeply into the intricacies of the smart contracts to provide a comprehensive security review. The audit process was meticulous, leveraging both automated tools and manual code analysis to identify potential vulnerabilities. Our objective was to ensure the integrity, security, and reliability of Rujira Fin's smart contracts, and to provide actionable recommendations to enhance their security posture.

During the audit, we identified several critical vulnerabilities that could have had significant implications if left unaddressed. The most severe findings involved the potential for direct fund theft through manipulation of zero-rate pools and unauthorized range transfers via spoofing. These vulnerabilities could have allowed attackers to steal assets directly from users or manipulate market conditions to their advantage. Additionally, we discovered issues related to market operations that could lead to denial of service, such as underflows and unbounded iterations. These findings highlight the importance of rigorous input validation and robust transaction handling to prevent exploitation by malicious actors.

We commend the Rujira Fin development team for their proactive approach and dedication to security. Their swift response to our findings and commitment to resolving critical vulnerabilities demonstrate a strong commitment to safeguarding user funds and maintaining the integrity of their platform. By addressing these concerns and implementing our recommendations, Rujira Fin has significantly strengthened its security posture. We encourage the team to continue their diligent efforts in maintaining a secure and resilient blockchain environment, ensuring trust and confidence among their users.

Project Details






Project	Rujira Fin
Website	https://rujira.network/
Repository	https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/tree/fin/v1.2/contracts/rujira-fin?ref_type=heads
Blockchain	THORChain
Audit Type	Smart Contract Audit Report
Initial Commit	9e78fabab7d5441743af3e925074beb79912be86
Final Commit	TBD
Timeline	29 January 2026 - 13 February 2026 Final Report: 13 February 2026

Structure & Organization of The Security Report

Issues are tagged as “Open”, “Acknowledged”, “Partially Resolved”, “Resolved” or “Closed” depending on whether they have been fixed or addressed.

- Open: The issue has been reported and is awaiting remediation from developer team.
- Acknowledged: The developer team has reviewed and accepted the issue but has decided not to fix it.
- Partially Resolved: Mitigations have been applied, yet some risks or gaps still remain.
- Resolved: The issue has been fully addressed and no further work is necessary.
- Closed: The issue is deemed no longer pertinent or actionable.

Furthermore, the severity of each issue is written as assessed by the risk of exploitation or other unexpected or otherwise unsafe behavior:

 Critical	The issue affects the platform in such a way that funds may be lost, allocated incorrectly, or otherwise result in a significant loss.
 High	The issue affects the ability of the platform to compile or operate in a significant way.
 Medium	The issue affects the ability of the platform to operate in a way that doesn't significantly hinder its behavior.
 Low	The issue has minimal impact on the platform's ability to operate.
 Info	The issue is informational in nature and does not pose any direct risk to the platform's operation.

Methodology

Threat Modelling

We will employ a threat modelling approach to identify potential attack vectors and risks associated with the smart contract(s). This involves:

1. Asset Identification: Enumerating the critical assets within the smart contract(s), such as tokens, sensitive data, access controls, and more.
2. Threat Enumeration: Identifying potential threats such as reentrancy, integer overflow/underflow, denial of service, and more.
3. Vulnerability Assessment: Assessing vulnerabilities in the context of the smart contract(s) and its interaction with external components.
4. Risk Prioritization: Prioritizing identified threats based on their severity and potential impact.

Manual Code Review

Our manual analysis involves an in-depth review of the smart contract(s) source code, focusing on:

1. Code Review Line-by-line examination to detect vulnerabilities and ensure compliance with best practices.
2. Logic Analysis: Analyzing the smart contract(s) Business logic for vulnerabilities and inconsistencies.
3. Gas Optimization: Identifying areas for gas optimization and efficiency improvements.
4. Access Control Review: Ensuring proper access controls and permission management.
5. External Dependencies: Assessing the security implications of external dependencies or oracles.

Functional Testing in Hardhat/Foundry

We will perform functional testing using Hardhat/Foundry to ensure the correctness and reliability of the smart contract(s). This includes:

1. Functional Testing: Writing comprehensive tests to cover various functionalities and edge cases.
2. Integration Testing: Verifying the interaction of smart contract(s) with other components.
3. Deployment Verification: Ensuring the correctness of smart contract(s) deployment.

Fuzzing and Invariant Testing

If deemed necessary based on the complexity and criticality of the smart contract(s), we will perform fuzzing and invariant testing to identify vulnerabilities that might not be caught through conventional methods. This includes:

1. Fuzz Testing: Employing fuzzing techniques to generate invalid, unexpected, or random inputs to trigger potential vulnerabilities.
2. Invariant Testing: Verifying invariants and properties to ensure the correctness and consistency of the smart contract(s) across various scenarios.

Edge Cases Scenarios Coverage

Our audit will thoroughly cover a wide spectrum of edge cases, including but not limited to:

1. Extreme Inputs: Testing with extreme and boundary inputs to assess resilience.
2. Exception Handling: Evaluating how the contract(s) handle exceptional scenarios.
3. Concurrency: Assessing the contract(s) behaviour in concurrent or simultaneous interactions.
4. Non-Standard Scenarios: Analyzing non-standard use cases that might impact contract(s) behaviour.

Reporting and Recommendations

A thorough description of the issue, highlighting the potential impact on the system.

1. The location within the codebase where the issue is found.
2. A clear explanation of the vulnerability, its root cause, and its potential exploitation.
3. Code snippets or detailed instructions on how to address the vulnerability.
4. Best practices and coding guidelines to prevent similar issues in the future.
5. We will suggest improvements in the overall system architecture or design, if relevant.
6. Wherever applicable, we'll include a PoC to demonstrate issue severity, aiding effective mitigation.

Report Generation

1. Document all findings, including identified vulnerabilities, their severity, and potential impact.
2. Provide clear and actionable recommendations for addressing security issues.

Remediation Support

1. Collaborate with the project's development team to address and remediate identified vulnerabilities.
2. Review and validate code changes and security fixes.

Final Assessment

Re-evaluate the project's security posture after remediation efforts to ensure vulnerabilities have been adequately addressed.

In-scope

- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/ranges/range.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/contract.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/order_pool/pool.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/order_pool/order_manager.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/ranges/scl.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/ranges/iter.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/ranges/execute.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/order_pool/order.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/ranges/tests.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/market_maker/context.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/config.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/ranges/range_offer.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/order_pool/pool_key.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/market_maker/iter.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/testing/xyk.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/ranges/events.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/ranges/context.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/market_maker/offer.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/swap_iter.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/error.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/market_maker/tests.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/order_pool/query.rs`
- `rujira-fin-v1.2-contracts-rujira-fin/contracts/rujira-fin/src/order_pool/execute.rs`

Summary of Findings

Severity	Total	Open	Acknowledged	Partially Resolved	Resolved
🔴 Critical	2	-	-	-	2
🔴 High	1	-	1	-	-
🟡 Medium	5	-	1	-	4
🟢 Low	1	-	1	-	-
🔵 Info	1	-	-	-	1
Total	10	0	3	0	7

#	Findings	Severity	Status
1	Oracle(-10000) Zero-Rate Pool Enables Direct Theft of Swap User Funds	🔴 Critical	Resolved
2	Unauthorized Range Transfer via Arb/DoRange Sender Spoofing	🔴 Critical	Resolved
3	MarketMaker commit() Fee Deduction Creates Impossible BOW min_return	🔴 High	Acknowledged
4	bid_pool::distribute_full Consumed-Offer Exceeds Passed Offer — Swapper Underflow DoS	🟡 Medium	Resolved
5	LP sandwich on 'RangeMsg::Create' due to lack of slippage control	🟡 Medium	Resolved
6	MarketMaker Netting Underflow Causes DoS	🟡 Medium	Resolved
7	Tick Change Strands Fixed-Price Orders, Locking User Funds	🟡 Medium	Resolved
8	Unbounded Orderbook Iteration Can Cause DoS	🟡 Medium	Acknowledged
9	Recursive RangeOfferIter Can DoS with Many Empty Ranges	🟢 Low	Acknowledged
10	Range Iterator Infinite Loop When range_delta == 0	🔵 Info	Resolved

Finding 1: Oracle(-10000) Zero-Rate Pool Enables Direct Theft of Swap User Funds

Severity: 🚫 Critical

Status: Resolved

Description:

`Premiumable::adjust` maps `bps == -10000` to a rate multiplier of exactly zero. An attacker can exploit the Quote-side order creation path — which does not call `inv()` and therefore does not panic — to store a persistent pool with `rate = 0` in contract state. This pool then silently absorbs subsequent swap users' offer tokens for zero return, allowing the attacker to claim those stolen tokens while keeping their original deposit intact.

Root Cause

`Premiumable::adjust` in `packages/rujira-rs/src/premium.rs`:

```
1 i16::MIN..=-1 => self * Decimal::from_ratio(10000u16 - bps.unsigned_abs(), 10000u16)
```

For `bps == -10000`: `numerator = 10000 - 10000 = 0` → `rate = oracle * 0 = 0`.

For `bps < -10000`: overflow-checks are enabled in release profile (`Cargo.toml`), so the `u16` subtraction panics — only `bps == -10000` reaches the zero-rate path without reverting.

The Quote-Side Asymmetry (Why Order Creation Succeeds)

In `execute_new_order` (`order_manager.rs`):

```
1 let opposite = side.other();
2 let mut swapper = Swapper::new(
3     ...,
4     SwapRequest::Limit {
5         price: match opposite {
6             Side::Base => pool.rate(),           // ← used when side == Quote
7             Side::Quote => pool.rate().inv().unwrap(), // ← used when side == Base
8         },
9         ...
10    },
11    ...
12 );
```

- `Side::Base` path: `opposite = Quote` → calls `pool.rate().inv().unwrap()` → `rate` is 0 → `inv()` returns `None` → `.unwrap()` panics → tx reverts → order NOT stored.
- `Side::Quote` path: `opposite = Base` → calls `pool.rate()` directly → returns 0 → no panic. The swapper runs with `limit = 0`, immediately breaks on all Base-side pools (`achieved > 0 = limit`), and returns with `consumed_offer = 0`, `remaining_offer = target`. Then `pool.create_order(storage, ..., target)` stores the order. The rate-0 pool is now persistently in state.

How the Stored Rate-0 Pool Steals Funds During Swaps

When any user swaps by sending base tokens (\rightarrow side = Side::Quote), Pool::iter includes the stored rate-0 pool. In Pool::swap (SwapItem impl, pool.rs):

```
1 let rate = match self.side {
2     Side::Base => self.rate.inv().unwrap(),
3     Side::Quote => self.rate, // ← 0, no inv(), no panic
4 };
5 let res = self.pool.distribute(offer.into(), &Decimal256::from(rate));
```

distribute(remaining_offer, rate=0) calls distribute_partial(bids_value=0, offer):

- consumed_offer = offer \rightarrow victim's entire remaining offer consumed
- consumed_bids = 0 \rightarrow attacker's bid untouched
- ratio = $1 - 0/\text{total} = 1 \rightarrow$ pool product unchanged, attacker's bid amount stays the same
- Pool sum updated with offer / total \rightarrow attacker's filled amount increases by victim's tokens

Back in Swapper::swap (swapper.rs):

```
1 if let SwapRequest::Limit { price: limit, .. } = self.req {
2     if !bids.is_zero() { // bids == 0 → SKIPPED
3         ...
4     }
5 }
6 self.context = next_context; // COMMITTED
```

The !bids.is_zero() guard skips the limit-price check whenever bids is zero. For YoLo/Min requests, there is no per-step guard at all. The step is unconditionally committed.

After the loop, SwapRequest::YoLo performs no return check. SwapRequest::Min only reverts if returned < min_return — but if legitimate pools already filled enough to meet the minimum, the rate-0 theft goes through silently.

Attacker Recovery

The attacker sends a subsequent Order message targeting the same (Side::Quote, Price::Oracle(-10000)) pool:

1. maybe_withdraw \rightarrow pool.claim_order claims filled tokens \rightarrow returned in ask denom (base tokens). These are the victim's stolen tokens.
2. Retract to target = 0 \rightarrow pool.retract_order returns the attacker's original quote tokens, since consumed_bids = 0 during the theft.

Net result: attacker keeps their quote tokens AND gains the victim's base tokens.

Impact:

- **Direct fund theft:** attacker steals base tokens from every swap user whose transaction reaches the rate-0 pool.
- **Persistent:** the pool stays in state indefinitely, affecting all future `Side::Quote` swaps until governance intervention.
- **No special privileges required:** any user can create the malicious order.
- **Yolo swaps fully exploitable:** no return check protects the victim.
- **Min swaps partially exploitable:** theft succeeds whenever the `min_return` is met by earlier legitimate pools.

Proof of Concept:

Step 1 — Attacker plants the rate-0 pool

```

1 // Attacker sends 1_000_000 quote tokens alongside:
2 ExecuteMsg::Order((
3   vec![
4     (
5       Side::Quote,           // ← Quote side, NOT Base
6       Price::Oracle(-10000), // ← rate = oracle * 0 = 0
7       Some(Uint128::from(1_000_000u128)),
8     ),
9   ],
10  None,
11 ))

```

Execution trace (succeeds, no panic):

```

1 ExecuteMsg::Order
2   → Arb { then: DoOrder }
3   → DoOrder
4   → execute_orders
5     → Pool::load(Price::Oracle(-10000), Side::Quote, oracle)
6       → price.to_rate(oracle) = 0
7     → execute_new_order(side=Quote)
8       → opposite = Base
9       → limit price = pool.rate() = 0 (no inv(), so won't revert)
10      → Swapper runs, breaks immediately on all Base pools
11      → swap result: consumed=0, remaining=1_000_000
12      → pool.create_order(storage, ..., 1_000_000) // STORED IN STATE

```

Result: pool at `(Side::Quote, PoolType::Oracle, Price::Oracle(-10000))` with `total = 1_000_000` and `rate = 0` is now in `POOLS + BID_POOLS`.

Step 2 — Victim swaps (sends base tokens)

```

1 // Victim sends 500 base tokens alongside:
2 ExecuteMsg::Swap(SwapRequest::Yolo {
3   to: None,
4   callback: None,
5 })

```

Execution trace:

```

1  ExecuteMsg::Swap → Arb { then: DoSwap }
2    → DoSwap → execute_swap
3      → side = Side::Quote (ask_side of base token)
4      → Pool::iter(storage, Side::Quote, oracle)
5        → [... legitimate pools ...] [rate=0 pool at end]
6      → Swapper iterates:
7        → <legitimate pools fill some or all of the offer>
8        → rate=0 pool hit with remaining_offer:
9          → Pool::swap: rate = 0 (Side::Quote, no inv())
10         → distribute(remaining_offer, 0)
11         → distribute_partial(bids_value=0, remaining_offer)
12         → consumed_offer = remaining_offer ← ALL CONSUMED
13         → consumed_bids = 0 ← NOTHING RETURNED
14         → Swapper: bids=0, limit check SKIPPED, step COMMITTED
15         → remaining_offer = 0, returned += 0
16      → Yolo: no return check → Ok
17      → Victim receives 0 for the stolen portion

```

Step 3 — Attacker extracts stolen funds

```

1  // Attacker resubmits with target = 0 to claim + retract:
2  ExecuteMsg::Order((
3    vec![
4      (
5        Side::Quote,
6        Price::Oracle(-10000),
7        Some(Uint128::from(0u128)), // retract all
8      ),
9    ],
10    None,
11  ))

```

```

1  →
2  execute_existing_order
3  → maybe_withdraw: bid.filled > 0 → claims victim's base tokens
4  → retract to target=0: returns 1_000_000 quote tokens (bid was never consumed)

```

Attacker wallet after: 1,000,000 quote tokens + victim's base tokens.

Numeric Example

Actor	Before	Action	After
Attacker	1M USDC	Order(Quote, Oracle(-10000), 1M)	0 USDC (in pool)
Victim	500 BTC	Swap(Yolo), sends 500 BTC	0 BTC (stolen)
Attacker	—	Order(Quote, Oracle(-10000), 0)	1M USDC + 500 BTC

Remediation:

1. **Reject** `bps <= -10000` in `OrderManager::execute_orders` (or in `Price::to_rate`) before the pool is loaded.
2. **Guard** `distribute_partial` against `bids_value == 0`: `return Ok(DistributionResult::default())` when rate produces zero bids — zero-rate distributions should never consume offer.
3. **Guard** `Swapper::swap` against zero-bids steps: `skip/error` when `bids == 0 && offer > 0` instead of silently committing.
4. **Defense-in-depth**: replace `inv().unwrap()` with checked error handling in all execution paths.

Discussion:

Developer:

Hey, we've taken care of the issue you pointed out. You can check out the fix we made by heading over to this commit: `e9beff4a1c2a12eac3eca9df62014861b1e25370` on our GitLab. We hope this resolves everything on your end!

Fix URL: <https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/e9beff4a1c2a12eac3eca9df62014861b1e25370>

Auditor:

Great to hear you guys were on top of it! We'll review the changes in the commit you mentioned. Thanks for the quick turnaround, and we'll get back to you if we have any more questions or need further adjustments.

Finding 2: Unauthorized Range Transfer via Arb/DoRange Sender Spoofing

Severity: 🚫 Critical

Status: Resolved

Description:

The `ExecuteMsg::Arb` entry point accepts an arbitrary then message. Internal handlers (`DoRange`, `DoOrder`, `DoSwap`) only check that the caller is the contract itself and then trust the embedded `sender/recipient`. This allows spoofing of user identity for internal actions, enabling direct theft via ranges and unauthorized order management.

In `execute` (contract entry), the `DoRange` branch only enforces `info.sender == env.contract.address`.

- The `RangeMsg::Transfer` path in `execute_range` checks `sender == range.owner`.
- Because `sender` is passed as a parameter rather than derived from `info.sender`, a user can call `ExecuteMsg::Arb { then: Some(DoRange((victim, RangeMsg::Transfer{ idx, to }))) }`.
- `ExecuteMsg::Arb` does not authenticate the then message against the original caller, so the spoofed sender passes the ownership check.

The same unauthenticated then mechanism applies to `DoOrder((recipient, ...))`, allowing arbitrary modification/retraction of another user's orders.

Impact:

Attackers can steal ownership of arbitrary ranges and then withdraw/close/claim to drain assets (critical theft). They can also cancel or resize other users' orders (griefing/market manipulation).

Source:

`rujira-fin-v1.2/contrats/rujira-fin/src/contract.rs`, `execute()` `rujira-fin-v1.2/contrats/rujira-fin/src/ranges/execute.rs`, `execute_range()`

Proof of Concept:

1. Assume a victim owns range `idx = 7`.
2. Attacker submits `ExecuteMsg::Arb` with a crafted then message:

```
1 ExecuteMsg::Arb {  
2   then: Some(to_json_binary(&ExecuteMsg::DoRange((  
3     victim_addr,  
4     RangeMsg::Transfer { idx: 7u128.into(), to: attacker_addr.to_string() }  
5   )))?  
6 }
```

1. The contract validates only that `info.sender` is the contract itself and then trusts the embedded `victim_addr`.
2. `RangeMsg::Transfer` succeeds because `sender == range.owner`, and ownership moves to the attacker.

Remediation:

Remove the embedded sender/recipient parameters from internal handlers and derive ownership checks from the original caller. Alternatively, store and verify the authenticated original sender inside `Arb` and reject any mismatched internal call.

Discussion:

Developer:

Hey, thanks for catching that issue! We've gone ahead and addressed it, and the fix has been rolled out to production. You can check out the changes here: <https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/6a02edb25c9df83c550cceb7158466c6009a54d1>. Appreciate the help!

Fix URL: <https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/6a02edb25c9df83c550cceb7158466c6009a54d1>

Auditor:

We're glad to see that you took quick action on the issue we identified. It's great to know the mitigation is already in production. We'll review the fix at the provided link to ensure everything is secure. Thanks for your prompt response!

Finding 3: MarketMaker commit() Fee Deduction Creates Impossible BOW min_return

Severity: 🚨 High

Status: Acknowledged

Description:

In `MarketMakerContext::commit()`, the AMM fee is deducted from the `offer` tokens before sending them to the BOW contract, but `min_return` is set to the original unmodified `ask` amount. Because market maker prices are derived directly from BOW's own `Quote` query (which already embeds BOW's internal fee), there is zero margin to absorb the additional `fee_amm` deduction. BOW receives fewer input tokens but must meet the unchanged output target, causing every BOW swap to revert when `fee_amm > 0`.

Market maker offer prices originate from `bow::QueryMsg::Quote`, which computes an XYK swap and deducts BOW's own fee before returning the price. `MarketMakerIter::query_next()` (`iter.rs`) stores this price directly as `MarketMakerOffer::price`. When takers fill against the offer, `MarketMakerOffer::swap()` (`offer.rs`) uses that price to compute the (`offer`, `ask`) pair committed to the shared context. The `ask` therefore represents exactly what BOW should return for the full `offer`.

In `context.rs`, the `commit()` function:

1. Iterates compiled (`offer`, `ask`) pairs produced by `compile()`
2. Deducts `fee_amm` from `offer`:

```
1 let offer_fee = coin(  
2     offer.amount.multiply_ratio(fee.numerator(), fee.denominator()).u128(),  
3     offer.denom.clone(),  
4 );  
5 let offer = coin(offer.amount.sub(offer_fee.amount).u128(), offer.denom);
```

3. Sends the reduced offer to BOW but keeps `ask` (the original pre-fee amount) as `min_return`:

```
1 messages.push(CosmosMsg::Wasm(WasmMsg::Execute {  
2     contract_addr: addr.to_string(),  
3     msg: to_json_binary(&bow::ExecuteMsg::Swap {  
4         min_return: ask.clone(), // <-- NOT adjusted for fee  
5         ...  
6     })?,  
7     funds: vec![offer.clone()], // <-- reduced by fee  
8 }));
```

The existing test `test_market_maker_commit_fee` in `tests.rs` confirms:

- Two Quote-side swaps: 1000 @ 1.25 = 1250, and 1000 @ 1.5 = 1500.
- After compile: `offer` = 2000 BTC, `ask` = 2750 USDC.

- With 5% fee: BOW receives 1900 BTC but must return ≥ 2750 USDC.
- At the original weighted rate of 1.375, 1900 input yields ~ 2612 USDC < 2750 . BOW reverts.
- The test comment reads *“with a correct min return”*, indicating the developer believed this behavior was intended.

The test only asserts message construction (passes), but in on-chain execution the BOW `min_return` enforcement causes the transaction to revert. The reduced input cannot satisfy the original `min_return` because the MM quoted price was already the best rate BOW can offer for that swap size.

Impact:

When `fee_amm > 0` (the expected production configuration, typically `Decimal::permille(5) / 0.5%`), every swap routed through market makers reverts. This disables the entire BOW liquidity layer — one of the three core liquidity sources — severely degrading orderbook depth and execution quality. All user swaps, arb operations, order placements, and range operations that trigger market maker fills will fail.

Remediation:

Adjust `min_return` proportionally to the fee deducted from the offer:

```
1 let ask = coin(  
2   ask.amount.sub(ask.amount.multiply_ratio(fee.numerator(), fee.denominator()))  
3   ask.denom,  
4 );
```

Discussion:

Developer:

Hey, we've taken care of the issue with the FailSafe Admin. It's all mitigated now and we've acknowledged it on our end. Let us know if there's anything more you need from us on this.

Auditor:

Great to hear you've mitigated the issue with the FailSafe Admin. We'll review the changes on our end and follow up if we need anything else from you. Thanks for addressing it so promptly.

Finding 4: `bid_pool::distribute_full` Consumed-Offer Exceeds Passed Offer — Swapper Underflow DoS

Severity: 🟡 Medium

Status: Resolved

Description:

`bid_pool::Pool::distribute` uses a `+1` tolerance check to decide whether to fully consume the pool via `distribute_full`. The full-consumption path recomputes `consumed_offer` from `total / rate` rather than capping it at the caller's original offer, which can yield a `consumed_offer` greater than the offer that was passed in. The Swapper then executes `self.remaining_offer -= offer` with the inflated value, underflowing a `Uint128` and panicking. This is reachable during `execute_swap` against thinly-filled order tick pools at fractional rates, causing per-transaction reverts for affected users.

Note: the automatic arbitrage (Arb) path is **not** affected because it calls `SwapItem::swap` directly (not through Swapper) and guards profit checks with `checked_sub`, handling inflated values gracefully. Therefore this bug cannot cause a persistent market-wide DoS.

Root cause

In `packages/rujira-rs/src/bid_pool/pool.rs`, `distribute`:

```
1 pub fn distribute(  
2     &mut self,  
3     offer: Uint256,  
4     rate: &Decimal256,  
5 ) -> Result<DistributionResult, BidPoolError> {  
6     // ...  
7     let bids_value = offer.mul_floor(*rate);  
8     // +1 tolerance check:  
9     if bids_value + Uint256::one() >= self.total {  
10         return self.distribute_full(rate); // <-- ignores `offer`  
11     }  
12     self.distribute_partial(bids_value, offer)  
13 }
```

When `bids_value` is exactly 1 unit short of `self.total` (which commonly happens due to integer truncation of `offer * rate`), the `+1` check passes and `distribute_full` is called. But `distribute_full` does not receive the original offer:

```
1 fn distribute_full(&mut self, rate: &Decimal256) -> Result<DistributionResult, BidPoolError> {  
2     let consumed_offer = self  
3         .total  
4         .multiply_ratio(rate.denominator(), rate.numerator());  
5     // ...  
6     Ok(DistributionResult {  
7         consumed_offer, // <-- can exceed original offer  
8         consumed_bids: self.total,  
9         snapshots,  
10     })  
11 }
```

`consumed_offer = total / rate`. Because `total` was compared against `bids_value + 1` (not `bids_value`), the back-calculation can produce a value larger than the caller's offer.

Flow to panic

- 1. `Pool::swap` (at `contracts/rujira-fin/src/order_pool/pool.rs`) calls `self.pool.distribute(offer.into(), &rate)` and returns `res.consumed_offer` as the offer amount consumed.
- 2. `Swapper::swap` (at `packages/rujira-rs/src/exchange/swapper.rs`) does:

```
1 self.remaining_offer -= offer; // Uint128 subtraction panics on underflow
```

If `offer > remaining_offer`, this panics.

Why the Arb path is safe

The Arb mechanism uses a separate code path from Swapper. In `Arbitrage::arbitrage` (at `packages/rujira-rs/src/exchange/arb.rs`), the arber calls `SwapItem::swap` directly on `RootItem` (a nested `EitherOrBoth<..>` structure). The `EitherOrBoth::swap` implementation only **adds** consumed offers from sub-items — it never subtracts `consumed_offer` from the input amount. The inflated value simply propagates upward to the profit check:

```
1 match (b.1.checked_sub(a.0), a.1.checked_sub(b.0)) {
2   (Ok(a), Ok(b)) => { /* commit profitable arb */ }
3   _ => Ok(None), // graceful exit, no panic, no state commit
4 }
```

The `checked_sub` catches any overflow and returns `Ok(None)`, causing `Arber::run` to break. No panic occurs and no state is committed.

Concrete example

Parameter	Value
<code>pool.total</code>	10
<code>rate</code>	0.1 (= numerator 10^17, denominator 10^18)
<code>Swapper.remaining_offer</code>	99
<code>bids_value = 99 * 0.1</code>	9 (truncated)
<code>bids_value + 1 = 10 >= 10</code>	true → routes to <code>distribute_full</code>
<code>consumed_offer = 10 / 0.1</code>	100
<code>remaining_offer - consumed_offer</code>	99 - 100 → underflow panic

In this scenario, the pool contains 10 units at rate 0.1. A swap with 99 offer arrives. The integer-truncated `bids_value` of 9 plus the +1 tolerance equals `total`, so `distribute_full` fires. It back-computes `consumed_offer = 100`, exceeding the actual offer of 99, and the Swapper panics.

The overflow window for a given `rate` and `total` is approximately $1/\text{rate} - 1$ values wide. For `rate = 0.1`, `total = 10`, any offer in `[90, 99]` triggers the bug. For `rate = 0.01`, `total = 1`, the window is ~99 values wide.

Trigger conditions

This is reachable whenever:

1. A limit-order pool has a small `total` at a fractional rate (common for low-liquidity ticks)
2. A swap offer slightly undershoots the pool's back-computed offer requirement
3. The +1 tolerance bridges the gap, routing to `distribute_full`

Affected code paths

Entry Point	SwapRequest Type	Affected?
<code>execute_swap</code>	<code>Yolo / Min / Exact</code>	Yes — no in-loop price guard, unconditional panic
<code>execute_swap</code>	<code>Limit</code>	Sometimes — the limit price check may break before the underflow if the achieved price exceeds the limit
<code>execute_new_order</code>	<code>Limit</code> (auto-set to order price)	Conditional — the limit check may protect
<code>QueryMsg::Simulate</code>	<code>Yolo</code>	Yes — query fails (no state change)
<code>ExecuteMsg::Arb</code>	N/A (uses <code>SwapItem::swap</code> directly)	No — <code>checked_sub</code> handles gracefully

Impact:

- **Per-swap DoS:** Individual `execute_swap` transactions (`Yolo/Min/Exact`) that exhaust better liquidity and reach the affected pool will panic and revert. No funds are lost (transaction reverts cleanly).
- **Griefing vector:** An attacker can create a limit order at a carefully selected fractional price with a small amount. Any user swap large enough to reach that tick in the book will revert. The attacker's pool sits deep in the book (low rate), so only swaps exhausting all better liquidity are affected.

- **No market-wide DoS:** The automatic arbitrage mechanism is unaffected because it uses `checked_sub` for profit validation. All `Swap`, `Order`, and `Range` operations that don't hit the poisoned pool through `Swapper` continue to function normally.
- **Query impact:** Simulate queries for large offers covering the affected tick will also fail.

Remediation:

Cap the `consumed_offer` returned by `distribute_full` to the original offer value. The simplest fix is to thread `offer` into `distribute_full`:

```
1 fn distribute_full(  
2     &mut self,  
3     offer: Uint256,  
4     rate: &Decimal256,  
5 ) -> Result<DistributionResult, BidPoolError> {  
6     let consumed_offer = self  
7         .total  
8         .multiply_ratio(rate.denominator(), rate.numerator())  
9         .min(offer); // <-- cap at original offer  
10    // ...  
11 }
```

Discussion:

Developer:

Hey, we went ahead and fixed the issue you pointed out. You can check out the details of what we did at this link: <https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/970b137861042cbb9477610d7918ea1a7e013eb1>. Let us know if everything looks good on your end!

Fix URL: <https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/970b137861042cbb9477610d7918ea1a7e013eb1>

Auditor:

Great to hear you've addressed the issue! We'll take a look at the changes you've made in that commit and get back to you if there's anything else. Thanks for getting on top of this so quickly!

Finding 5: LP sandwich on RangeMsg::Create due to lack of slippage control**Severity:** 🟡 Medium**Status:** Resolved**Description:**

RangeMsg::Create balances deposits using Range::mid_price() derived from existing ranges (not the order-book). Attackers can front-run with dust ranges to skew the mid-price and force a victim's deposit split, then trade against the newly created range.

Impact:

Victims can receive an adverse base/quote composition and suffer MEV losses when attackers trade against the skewed range.

Remediation:

Add min-amount or price-bound parameters to RangeMsg::Create.

Discussion:*Developer:*

Hey, we've added a safety check for the UI on the FailSafe Admin. While we think that the chance of malicious front-running is pretty low, it's still a good idea to have this extra layer of protection in place. You can check out the changes we made here: <https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/0475cf1df0bab03a8e9e9ff2f077261611dd2a1f>.

Fix URL: <https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/0475cf1df0bab03a8e9e9ff2f077261611dd2a1f>

Auditor:

So, we've reviewed the changes made to the FailSafe Admin, and it's looking good. Adding that safety check for the UI was definitely a smart move, even if the risk of front-running isn't super high. It's always better to be safe than sorry, right? Everything seems to be in order with the latest commit.

Finding 6: MarketMaker Netting Underflow Causes DoS

Severity: 🟡 Medium

Status: Resolved

Description:

`MarketMakerContext::compile` can underflow when netting opposite-direction entries for the same market maker, causing a panic and reverting the entire `Arb` execution.

- Netting logic in `contracts/rujira-fin/src/market_maker/context.rs` subtracts `ask_coin.amount` and `offer_coin.amount` when directions oppose.
- If opposite-direction entries have mismatched ratios (common when prices differ), `a.amount -= ask_coin.amount` (or the inverse) can underflow `uint128`, panicking.
- This can occur when `Arb` consumes both sides from the same market maker in a single run, or when a malicious market maker returns skewed quotes.

Impact:

Panics during `Arb` execution revert swaps, order management, and range operations (all are wrapped in `Arb`). This enables a denial of service under adversarial or volatile conditions.

Remediation:

Use checked arithmetic and net by value in a single currency before converting, or enforce invariants that guarantee no underflow when offsetting opposite-direction entries.

Discussion:

Developer:

We've looked into the issue with the market makers, and honestly, we think it's unlikely to cause any trouble since we have complete control over them. But just to be on the safe side and prevent any panics, we've added some additional checks. You can check out the changes we made here: [commit link](#).

Fix URL: <https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/061c342f1cbc9a89320937254bd4d8c696f9357d>

Auditor:

We appreciate the proactive steps you've taken to add those checks, even though the risk seemed low due to your control over the market makers. It's good to see you're prioritizing stability and peace of mind. We'll review the updates to ensure everything's solid.

Finding 7: Tick Change Strands Fixed-Price Orders, Locking User Funds

Severity: 🟡 Medium

Status: Resolved

Description:

When governance changes the tick size via `SudoMsg::UpdateConfig` or `migrate`, existing Fixed-price orders at prices valid for the old tick but invalid for the new tick become permanently inaccessible. The order owner cannot withdraw filled amounts, retract remaining bids, or resize the order — yet the order continues to be filled by incoming swaps and arbs, accumulating unretrievable proceeds.

Root cause: `OrderManager::execute_orders()` validates every Fixed price against the current tick before any operation, including withdrawal/retract of existing orders.

In `contracts/rujira-fin/src/order_pool/order_manager.rs`:

```
1  for (side, price, target) in o {
2    if let Price::Fixed(x) = price {
3      self.config.tick.validate_price(&x)?;
4    }
5    let mut pool = Pool::load(storage, &price, &side, oracle);
6    match pool.load_order(storage, &self.owner) {
7      Ok(mut order) => {
8        self.execute_existing_order(storage, &mut pool, &mut order, &side, target)?
9      }
10     // ...
11   }
12 }
```

The tick gate fires before `Pool::load` and `load_order`, preventing all downstream operations. There is no alternative code path to interact with orders outside `execute_orders`.

Tick change entry points — governance can change the tick via:

1. `SudoMsg::UpdateConfig` in `contracts/rujira-fin/src/contract.rs`:

```
1  config.update(deps.api, &update)?; // may change tick
2  config.validate(deps.as_ref())?;
3  config.save(deps.storage)?;
```

2. `migrate` in `contracts/rujira-fin/src/contract.rs`:

```
1  config.update(deps.api, &msg)?; // may change tick
```

Neither migrates existing orders to the new tick.

The stranded orders keep filling. `Pool::iter()` in `contracts/rujira-fin/src/order_pool/pool.rs` iterates POOLS by storage prefix without any tick validation:

```

1  let fixed = POOLS
2    .prefix((side.clone(), PoolType::Fixed))
3    .range(storage, None, None, order)
4    .filter_map(populate);

```

This means `SwapIter::iter()`, used by swaps and arbs, includes stranded orders. Incoming trades fill these orders, converting bid tokens into fill proceeds. The `BidPool::distribute` mechanism credits filled amounts to the order's `Bid`, but the owner can never call `maybe_withdraw → claim_order` to retrieve them.

Queries still work. `query_order` and `query_orders` in `contracts/rujira-fin/src/order_pool/query.rs` load orders directly via `Pool::load → load_order` without tick validation. The user can see their stranded order and its growing filled balance, but cannot interact with it.

Example scenario:

1. Contract deployed with `Tick(4)`. User places a `Side::Quote` order at `Price::Fixed(1.234)` — valid for 4 significant figures.
2. Governance changes tick to `Tick(2)` via `SudoMsg::UpdateConfig`.
3. `Tick(2).validate_price(&1.234)` fails — 1.234 truncated to 2 sig figs is 1.2 \neq 1.234.
4. User attempts `Order([(Side::Quote, Price::Fixed(1.234), None)])` to withdraw fills → reverts at tick validation.
5. User attempts `Order([(Side::Quote, Price::Fixed(1.234), Some(0))])` to fully retract → reverts at tick validation.
6. Meanwhile, swaps continue filling the order at price 1.234, converting user's quote tokens to base proceeds that accumulate unretrievably.

Impact:

Permanent fund lockup for all users with Fixed-price orders at prices incompatible with the new tick. The severity scales with:

- The magnitude of the tick change (e.g., `Tick(6) → Tick(2)` strands many more prices than `Tick(4) → Tick(3)`)
- The total value locked in affected price levels
- The continued filling of stranded orders wastes the user's bid tokens while accumulating unretrievable proceeds

Oracle-priced orders (`Price::Oracle`) are unaffected since they bypass the tick validation entirely.

Remediation:

Skip tick validation when the user's intent is withdrawal/retract only. Add a dedicated code path or guard:

```
1  for (side, price, target) in o {
2    let is_retract_or_withdraw = target.map_or(true, |t| t.is_zero());
3    if let Price::Fixed(x) = price {
4      if !is_retract_or_withdraw {
5        self.config.tick.validate_price(&x)?;
6      }
7    }
8    // ...
9  }
```

Discussion:

Developer:

Hey, just wanted to let you know we've already taken care of the issue you flagged with the FailSafe Admin. You can check out the fix we implemented in the latest commit here: <https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/86f779bc4643c9abbe1b0774ebb9d1ddc76e18fd>. Let us know if there's anything else!

Fix URL: <https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/86f779bc4643c9abbe1b0774ebb9d1ddc76e18fd>

Auditor:

Thanks for the quick update! We saw that you addressed the issue with the FailSafe Admin. We'll review your latest commit to ensure everything's in order. If we spot anything else, we'll reach out. Appreciate your prompt action on this!

Finding 8: Unbounded Orderbook Iteration Can Cause DoS

Severity: 🟡 Medium

Status: Acknowledged

Description:

SwapIter merges pools, ranges, and market makers into a single iterator that is consumed during swap and arb execution. There are no minimum deposit sizes or limits on the number of price levels/ranges, so an attacker can create many dust positions and force long iterations that risk out-of-gas failures.

- The swap path iterates the merged sources in `contracts/rujira-fin/src/swap_iter.rs`.
- `Swapper::swap` consumes this iterator in a **for** loop until the offer is fully consumed or a limit breaks in `packages/rujira-rs/src/exchange/swapper.rs`.
- Range creation only enforces non-empty funds, with no minimum size in `contracts/rujira-fin/src/ranges/execute.rs`.
- Order creation uses the provided target amount with no minimum size checks in `contracts/rujira-fin/src/order_pool/order_manager.rs`.
- This allows an attacker to create a large number of dust pools/ranges across many price levels, inflating the iterator length and swap execution cost.

Impact:

Swaps and arbs may exceed gas limits when the orderbook is flooded with many small pools/ranges, resulting in a denial of service for normal users. The impact depends on the attacker's willingness to lock funds but can still materially degrade market availability.

Remediation:

- Enforce minimum order and range sizes.
- Limit the number of active price levels or ranges per user and/or globally.
- Prune dust positions and consider expirations for inactive entries.
- Consider gas-bounded execution strategies that limit iteration per call.

Discussion:

Developer:

Hey, so we've been aware of this potential vector since we first rolled out fin back in mid-2022. It hasn't really caused any issues for us since then, so we've acknowledged and accepted it as part of our system.

Auditor:

We noticed that the developers are aware of this vector and have accepted it since the initial release of fin in mid-2022. It seems like it hasn't posed any problems so far, but we'll keep it on our radar to ensure it stays that way.

Finding 9: Recursive RangeOfferIter Can DoS with Many Empty Ranges

Severity: 🟡 Low

Status: Acknowledged

Description:

`RangeOfferIter::next()` uses recursion when an offer slice has zero liquidity. If many ranges have zero liquidity, the recursion depth can grow large, risking stack overflow or excessive gas usage.

- `Range::withdraw` can reduce base/quote to zero but does not remove the range from storage.
- `RangeOfferIter::next()` calls itself recursively when `offer.total.is_zero()`.
- With a large number of empty ranges, the iterator can recurse many times before finding non-empty liquidity, leading to deep call stacks and wasted gas.
- Each empty range still required a non-zero initial deposit (potentially dust) before withdrawing 100% to reach zero liquidity.

Impact:

Excessive recursion can waste gas and, in extreme cases with many empty ranges, cause swap execution to fail. It does not inherently freeze the market but can degrade reliability under adversarial spam.

Remediation:

Replace recursion with an explicit loop and consider pruning ranges with zero liquidity from storage to keep the iterator bounded.

Discussion:

Developer:

Hey, so we tackled the issue with the storage ranges. Instead of pruning them, which might cause problems since they can be empty in just one direction, we decided to move the secondary index out of the way. This way, those pesky empty ranges won't mess with the iterator. If you're curious about the fix, you can check it out here: https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/blob/fin/v1.2/contracts/rujira-fin/src/ranges/range.rs?ref_type=heads#L98.

Fix URL: https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/blob/fin/v1.2/contracts/rujira-fin/src/ranges/range.rs?ref_type=heads#L98

Auditor:

We took a look at the developer's approach to handling the storage ranges issue. Their solution to move the secondary index rather than pruning the ranges seems like a smart move. It prevents any potential issues with empty ranges affecting the iterator. This approach should keep things running smoothly without unintended side effects.

Finding 10: Range Iterator Infinite Loop When `range_delta == 0`

Severity: i Info

Status: Resolved

Description:

If `range_delta` is zero, `RangeOfferIter` fails to advance price steps and can recurse indefinitely during swap iteration, leading to a gas-exhaustion DoS.

- `range_delta` is configurable and not validated in `Config::validate`.
- `RangeOfferIter::candidates` computes `step = start * delta`.
- With `delta == 0`, `step == 0`, so the next price candidate can remain equal to `start`.
- `RangeOfferIter::next()` builds a `RangeOffer` with `start == end`, yielding `total == 0`, and recursively calls `next()` again without advancing state.

Impact:

Any swap or arb that touches range liquidity can loop until out-of-gas, causing a denial of service.

Remediation:

Enforce `range_delta > 0` (and ideally a minimum tick-safe value) in config validation and updates. Consider also adding a guard in the iterator to prevent zero-step progress.

Discussion:

Developer:

Hey, so we addressed the issue with the FailSafe Admin by adding it to our config validation. You can check out the changes we made in this commit: [6f2a162687a180d3af903b499ba6790bc7322d04](https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/6f2a162687a180d3af903b499ba6790bc7322d04). This should handle the problem we identified.

Fix URL: <https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/6f2a162687a180d3af903b499ba6790bc7322d04>

Auditor:

It looks like you guys tackled the FailSafe Admin issue by updating the config validation, which is great. We'll

take a look at the specific changes in the commit you mentioned to ensure everything's aligned with security best practices. Thanks for the quick response on that!

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